Why and how NATO should adapt to a new Mediterranean security environment by Kasapoglu, Can
www.ssoar.info
Why and how NATO should adapt to a new
Mediterranean security environment
Kasapoglu, Can
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Stellungnahme / comment
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP)
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Kasapoglu, C. (2019). Why and how NATO should adapt to a new Mediterranean security environment. (SWP
Comment, 15/2019). Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik -SWP- Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und
Sicherheit. https://doi.org/10.18449/2019C15
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-62443-8
  
 
NO. 15 MARCH 2019 Introduction 
Why and How NATO Should Adapt to a 
New Mediterranean Security Environment 
Can Kasapoğlu 
NATO faces a problematic threat landscape in the Mediterranean. The Alliance has 
to deal with hot topics that range from Russia’s robust military posture and involve-
ment in the Syrian Civil War to ISIS terrorism and the migrant crisis. To address all of 
these challenges, NATO should boost its engagement with partner nations, produce a 
new maritime security approach, and counterbalance Moscow’s strategic foothold in 
the eastern Mediterranean. 
 
Against the backdrop of Russia’s interven-
tions in Georgia and Ukraine, the Alliance’s 
eastern flank has been the geopolitical epi-
center of contention between NATO and 
Russia while the southern flank has taken a 
back seat. The Armed Forces of the Russian 
Federation enjoy clear superiority in their 
Western Military District over the Baltic 
NATO members (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithua-
nia) and Poland. Moreover, this correlation 
of forces is augmented by the strong com-
bined-arms and mobilization capabilities 
of the Russian military. Notably, RAND’s 
Arroyo Center conducted a series of war 
games in 2014 and 2015 simulating a Rus-
sian incursion into the Baltics. The findings, 
published in a special report in 2016, high-
lighted that Russian forces could reach 
the outskirts of Tallinn and Riga within 60 
hours. These considerations put the eastern 
flank affairs at the forefront for NATO 
while the southern flank – and the Medi-
terranean in particular – remains an over-
shadowed flashpoint. Indeed, these war 
game reports concluded nightmare sce-
narios for capitals in the eastern flank, 
but key metropoles of NATO nations have 
already witnessed devastating terrorist 
attacks stemming from the south. The 
migrant crisis has plagued the Euro-Medi-
terranean area. In addition, as underlined 
by the 2018 Brussels Summit Declaration, 
Turkey has been hit three times in the last 
four years by missiles launched from Syria. 
Finally, the Mediterranean witnessed the 
most dangerous chemical weapons use of 
the 21st century, which triggered US-led 
punitive strikes against the Syrian Baath 
regime. In brief, NATO’s southern flank has 
gone through fire and water. 
The Alliance faces two risk categories in 
the south. First, there is the rise of violent 
non-state actors, state failures, and human 
security issues. Second, NATO has to deal 
with state-led challenges emanating from 
Russia’s rising military posture in the 
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eastern Mediterranean. However, unlike 
the broadly accepted eastern flank narrative, 
the allies have yet to reach a consensus in 
the south. 
Terrorist Threats and Spillovers 
On November 13, 2015, a series of coordi-
nated terrorist attacks shook Paris. Within 
five days, France’s flagship Charles de Gaulle 
aircraft carrier had left its home port in 
Toulon and sailed to the eastern Mediter-
ranean to conduct airstrikes on ISIS. The 
carrier then passed through the Suez Canal 
to assume the command of the US task 
force in the Gulf (CTF-50) in counter-terror-
ism operations. Around the same time, 
then-French Prime Minister Manuel Valls 
told parliament that France could be at risk 
of a chemical or biological terrorism attack. 
In fact, only one year earlier, a laptop cap-
tured from a Tunisian ISIS operative in 
Syria revealed the terrorist group’s plans for 
using weapons of mass destruction, includ-
ing efforts to weaponize bubonic plague. 
Similar patterns – namely ISIS connec-
tions or time spent with ISIS fighters in the 
Middle East and North Africa – were pres-
ent in the 2016 Brussels bombings, the 
2016 Berlin Christmas market truck attack 
(the Tunisian perpetrator was linked to an 
ISIS cell in Libya), the 2016 Ataturk Airport 
attack in Istanbul, and the 2017 Istanbul 
nightclub shooting, among many others. 
The one and only time that the Alliance 
invoked Article V – the collective defense 
clause of the North Atlantic Treaty – was 
in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, less 
than 24 hours after al-Qaeda targeted NATO 
territory. Thus, NATO had acknowledged 
that the fight against terrorism was one of 
its duties. In October 2001, NATO’s Stand-
ing Naval Forces kicked off Operation 
Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean, 
a counter-terrorism effort conducted in 
compliance with Article V. 
There is little room for optimism regard-
ing the terrorism challenge in the south. 
Al-Qaeda was largely the product of the 
Afghan jihad in the 1980s, which attracted 
5,000 to 20,000 foreign fighters according 
to various estimates. The Syrian jihad, on 
the other hand, mobilized up to 40,000 
foreign fighters, with some 7,000 of those 
being from NATO countries. In other words, 
the real fallout from the Syrian jihad re-
mains to be seen in the coming decades. 
Failed and fragile states have become 
vectors for terrorism in the Euro-Mediter-
ranean region. Syria and Libya may never 
function as “states” in a Weberian sense 
again, as militancy could turn into “insti-
tutionalized warlordism” in these countries. 
NATO should grasp this trend in a geo-
politically holistic way. Due to global demo-
graphic trends, intrastate conflicts increas-
ingly tend to take place in urbanized areas. 
Coupled with the growing lethality of mod-
ern firepower, overwhelming migrant in-
fluxes will accompany each urban warfare 
case from now on. 
Terrorist activity across the southern 
Mediterranean is complex in nature. Tuni-
sia has a problematic home-grown mili-
tancy issue, and this jihadist potential has 
found a safe haven in Libya amidst the 
collapse of the Libyan state. Open-source 
intelligence suggests that training camps 
established in Libya were used to dispatch 
Tunisian foreign fighters to Syria. The mili-
tancy issue in Libya also threatens Egypt’s 
Western Desert area and overstretches 
Egyptian security forces between the Libyan 
frontier and Sinai. In many cases, one can-
not separate smuggling, terrorism, and 
violent extremism from each other in the 
southern Mediterranean. The Algerian 
national Mokhtar Belmokhtar, for example, 
is a key figure in al-Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb as well as an infamous champion 
of organized crime. He is known as “Mr 
Marlboro” or “the King of Marlboros” due 
to his cigarette smuggling activities.  
Overall, NATO does not have an easy way 
out. Much like its close cooperation with 
eastern flank partners, for example Finland 
and Sweden, the Alliance needs to boost its 
engagement in the southern flank with its 
Mediterranean Dialogue partners. In fact, 
the Mediterranean Dialogue is a product 
of NATO’s post-Cold War efforts. Since its 
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establishment in 1994, the regional security 
environment has gained completely differ-
ent characteristics. At present, the Alliance 
needs to initiate tailor-made assistance pro-
grams for border security, security sector 
reform, intelligence cooperation with NATO 
structures, humanitarian challenges, and 
counter-terrorism. 
Furthermore, although the establish-
ment of the NATO Strategic Direction South 
Hub (2017) is a milestone for the Alliance, 
the hub can only make a meaningful differ-
ence if it can ensure the Mediterranean Dia-
logue partners’ permanent engagements. 
Otherwise, this important effort might not 
be embraced by its target audience. 
State-led Challenge: Russia as 
NATO’s Southern Neighbor 
As these risks from non-state actors persist, 
NATO has a new and ambitious neighbor in 
the Mediterranean. 
The intervention in Syria has fostered 
the Russian military’s combat readiness. 
According to the Russian Ministry of 
Defense, more than 63,000 military per-
sonnel – including 434 generals and more 
than 26,000 officers – served in Syria. This 
includes about 90 percent of the combat 
pilots who have flown missions over the 
Syrian skies and 60 percent of the strategic 
and long-range aviation crews who have 
taken part in operations. Furthermore, 
Russia has tested more than 200 weapon 
systems through its campaign. The Syrian 
expedition has led to fundamental improve-
ments in the concept of operations. Long-
range precision-strike capabilities provided 
by Kalibr land-attack cruise missiles remain 
the most notable achievement in this 
respect. In October 2015, the Russian Navy 
first used these high-end missiles from 
warships in the Caspian Sea. The missiles 
reportedly traveled some 1,800 km before 
hitting their targets in Syria. The strikes 
marked a significant success for Moscow. 
In December 2015 and March 2017, Russian 
Navy submarines also launched Kalibr mis-
siles from the Mediterranean. Thus, NATO 
should be worried about the strategic 
ramifications of this trend. The Russian 
Navy can now use its relatively small 
vessels for long-range conventional strikes 
and commission its submarines to attack 
strategic targets deep in enemy territory 
without passing the nuclear threshold.  
Finally, Moscow has turned the Hmei-
mim Air Base into a “promotion path.” 
Most of the current or recent military 
district commanders have previously 
headed the Russian Group of Forces in 
Syria. More interestingly, General Sergei 
Surovikin – another former top com-
mander of the Russian contingent – now 
serves as chief of the Russian Aerospace 
Forces, marking the first example in this 
regard, as General Surovikin is not an 
aviator. Likewise, General Andrey Karta-
polov, now in charge of the newly estab-
lished Political-Military Directorate (an in-
formation warfare command), also made 
his way there through promotions at 
Hmeimim.  
In brief, Moscow’s military gains in the 
Syrian expedition inevitably affect the over-
all NATO–Russia balance. 
NATO Needs a Stronger 
Mediterranean Posture 
As reflected in the 2016 Warsaw Summit 
communiqué, the allied leaders have agreed 
on “projecting stability” on the southern 
flank. This strategy was based on the assess-
ment that NATO members can be secure if 
their neighborhoods are stable. The Alli-
ance learned this the hard way through the 
post-Arab Spring developments. In 2017, 
NATO officially joined the anti-ISIS coali-
tion and, in the same year, the NATO Stra-
tegic Direction South Hub was inaugurated 
in Naples. 
Another pillar of NATO’s Mediterranean 
engagement is Operation Sea Guardian 
(OSG). The Alliance directly refers to the 
importance of ensuring maritime security 
to protect today’s globalized economy when 
explaining the geopolitical grounds for the 
OSG. Indeed, nearly 65 percent of Western 
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Europe’s oil and gas consumption passes 
through the Mediterranean. The OSG also 
supports the European Union’s Operation 
Sophia to tackle the migrant crisis and 
human trafficking. 
A stronger allied posture in the Mediter-
ranean should be founded on an efficient 
maritime approach. NATO’s current mari-
time strategy, approved back in 2011, falls 
short of addressing the complex problems 
discussed hitherto. The Alliance needs a 
comprehensive maritime strategy docu-
ment to confront both state-led political-
military ambitions – including the anti-
access/area denial (A2/AD) challenge – 
and troublesome human security threats. 
Key Findings and Policy 
Recommendations 
During the Cold War, NATO protected 
democracies of the Euro-Atlantic area from 
Soviet expansionism. After 9/11, the allies 
had to tackle the global terrorism threat. 
Now, the pressing situation in the Mediter-
ranean necessitates ensuring maritime 
security, confronting human trafficking, 
preventing a foreign fighter influx into 
NATO territory, and counterbalancing 
Russia’s aspirations. 
NATO can only address human security 
problems and the terrorism challenge 
through a renewed cooperation model with 
its partners, because these risks are ema-
nating particularly from the southern 
neighborhood due to instability. 
When it comes to tackling state-led chal-
lenges, the reconstruction of Syria remains 
the primary leverage of the West. In this 
theater, the West should be capable of 
deterring Russia from turning the eastern 
Mediterranean into its backyard, but it 
should also be conditionally willing to 
cooperate with Moscow to ensure a stable 
Syria that does not produce and export 
instability anymore because it is “too fragile 
to ignore.” As the SWP paper of Professor 
Volker Perthes (SWP Comment 7/2019) 
emphasizes, Europe may not like the mili-
tary outcome in Syria, but compared to 
Iran’s agenda, Russia’s post-war design is 
not totally incompatible with Western 
interests. 
Although Russia – largely – won the 
war in Syria, it badly needs Western sup-
port to win the peace. The World Bank 
estimates that the reconstruction of the 
civil war-torn country will cost between 
$200 billion and $350 billion. Russia can-
not reconstruct housing and infrastructure 
in the absence of an international consen-
sus. If left unaided, Moscow could obtain 
a naval base, an air base, a war-criminal 
Syrian President who can never be fully 
rehabilitated on the world stage, and local 
warlord profiteers. Thus, through recon-
struction efforts, the West should encour-
age installing an internationally acceptable 
administration in Damascus so that dis-
placed Syrians in Europe (as well as Turkey, 
which is the only NATO nation bordering 
Syria) will not turn into permanent refugees. 
Moreover, the West should ensure Syria’s 
full compliance with the chemical disarma-
ment program – with the further aim of 
crippling the suspected biological weapons 
infrastructure. 
Although there are many sources of pes-
simism in the Mediterranean for NATO as 
it marks its 70th anniversary, there is also 
hope. After all, the Alliance’s top trait is 
adaptation. 
Dr Can Kasapoğlu is the 2018 IPC-Stiftung Mercator Fellow at SWP.  
The Mercator IPC Fellowship Program at SWP is funded by Stiftung Mercator. 
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